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## THE PROBLEM OF SUFFERING.

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AMONG the multitude of discussions of the problem of suffering there is one which so far transcends all others in its intensity, its dramatic power, its luxuriance of imagery, and its wealth of diction as to stand altogether by itself. Even if all superhuman elements be set aside, it still remains monumental. It is the natural point of departure of all later discussions, for though it led up to no declared solution, it opened out the question on lines so suggestive and so intense that they give alignment to the thought whenever it reverts to the theme. I need not say that I refer to the discussion of Job and his three friends.

To a layman this is additionally inviting as a point of departure in that there is little occasion to feel the restraints that spring from the delicacy attached to inspired writings; for little of the discussion has claim to inspiration. Eliphaz, Bildad, and Zophar were certainly not inspired; they were not even correct; not even approximately correct. In the outcome they were forced to make propitiatory offerings for their errors. Scarcely more can Job be regarded as inspired, though much more nearly correct in his positions. It was against him that the challenge from the whirlwind was directed—"Who is this that darkeneth council by words without knowledge?" And to this there was added a catechism the severity of which has never been surpassed. Every question was a chastisement. At the close, Job confessed that he had spoken things he understood not. To a layman, it seems doubtful if any part of the wonderful discussion has any claims to inspiration, under any rational interpretation, except this marvelous catechism. And *this* seems rather a majestic development of a great problem than a specific answer

to it. In view of this, our discussion may take its departure from this oriental disputation of Job and his three friends without serious embarrassment from the delicacy attaching to writings held to be inspired.

The burden of this oriental discussion lay on the proposition that afflictions such as Job suffered, loss of property, loss of children, and disease, are brought down by personal sin—"Who ever perished being innocent?" Between this extreme punitive view and Job's strong intrenchment behind divine responsibility and human submission—"The Lord gave and the Lord hath taken away,"—the contest wavered to and fro, no disputant holding firmly and consistently to his own position through all phases of attack and defense. Back of all, concealed from the disputants, was the celestial deployment of the incident in which the whole appears as a test of the integrity of Job.

Confining ourselves strictly to the humanistic point of view, as befits laymen, there are certain oversights and limitations of the discussion that seem to us very vital, though to the ancient and oriental mind they might easily appear negligible. The point of view throughout was closely and narrowly personal. The subject was rather the problem of Job than the problem of suffering. It did not even embrace all the human elements concerned—the seven sons, the three daughters, and the many servants slain. In the prelude there is indeed recognition of the sons and daughters and of possible error on their part, and a passing allusion to them appears in the discussion, but they are essentially lost from view. The calamity to the servants is ignored as a factor of the case. Beyond this, 7000 sheep were slain, and the exigencies of capture, to say nothing of the presumptive recklessness and hard-heartedness of the robbers, doubtless added much of suffering to the cattle upon which the Sabæans fell.

The discussion was thus much less broad than the calamity. Wide as was its range in some respects, and broad as was its sweep, it failed to cover the elements of even the immediate incident on which it was founded. That embraced not merely the calamities of one, but the misfortunes of more than 7000

living, sentient creatures capable of suffering. Their sufferings were doubtless not alike nor equal, but they all call for recognition in an attempt to interpret the meaning of the incident.

There was some attempt to extend the inquiry backward, but this scarcely went beyond the putative sins of Job that were urged by his friends as the cause of the calamity. We can scarcely say that there was any attempt to go back to the origin of such afflictions. And if there had been, it would not have been possible for them to follow backward the history of suffering over any considerable part of its extent, much less to have made any approach to its beginning. It was not permitted to them to look backward through the vast ages that embraced the beginning and the growth of suffering and to interpret it in the light of its prolonged history.

Was it this that called forth the opening question of the catechism, "Where wast thou when I laid the foundations of the earth?" Was it the purpose of this fundamental question to suggest that the basis of suffering was laid with the foundations of the earth, and that had Job witnessed the laying of these he would have learned the function of suffering? Were the following questions relative to the creatures that dwell on the earth, or the ordering of nature, intended further to suggest that in a knowledge of them may also be found light on the meaning of suffering? Was it the object of that majestic array of questions to point out a *line of inquiry*, as well as to reduce Job to becoming humility? Very possibly not. Very possibly there was no purpose of directing inquiry or even of rebuking Job for an error of method, but merely of impressing upon him the utter inadequacy of his knowledge for the right understanding of the events of which he was the subject. There seems rather more ground, indeed, for thinking that the questionings were designed to show that man's knowledge is too slight for the solution of such problems. But even if this be so, it would seem that increase of knowledge along the lines of deficiency, so trenchantly exposed, should help on to a better understanding of such problems, however much it might still fall short of complete adequacy. The very challenge which exposes the ignorance most effectively

stimulates a desire to remove it, and to go as far as possible toward meeting the conditions which the catechism suggests as prerequisites to an understanding of the matter.

Under either interpretation, therefore, it may not be more than following out the direct, or else the incidental, suggestions of the catechism to search among the foundations of the earth, and to study the creatures that have dwelt upon it, for light upon this dark problem. In the end, perchance, we may be, like Job, fit subjects for a like humiliating catechism, but if so, we may perhaps also remember that Job, notwithstanding all his faults, was prospered afterwards. A sincere questioning of the ways of the Almighty, however faulty the inquiry may be, and however much it may justly provoke rebuke for its incompetency, may yet lead to an appropriate reward, because it is an earnest striving for the higher truth.

What does a search among the foundations of the earth reveal respecting suffering?

1. A large part of all the suffering since the foundation of the world was felt before man appeared in it. I say a large part. This is certainly safe. If we had some trustworthy way of measuring suffering, a careful and candid weighing of the evidence would probably lead to the conclusion that *much more than half*—perhaps *very* much more than half—of all the suffering which the history of the globe has witnessed transpired before man became one of its inhabitants.

2. Not only was a large part of the sum total of suffering experienced before man existed, but nearly all the great types of suffering were experienced. Job's suffering, so far as it entered into the discussion, fell under three heads: the loss of possessions, the loss of offspring, and bodily pain. It may be safely said that all these forms existed long before man came upon the earth. There is no ground to doubt that in thousands of instances animals have been robbed of their possessions by the casualties of nature and by the predaceous assaults of the animal prototypes of the Sabæans. It is true, we are not accustomed to accord to the animals that right of discovery and of possession which we arrogate to ourselves; but does not the bird own its

nest as truly as the man owns his house? Does not the predaceous animal own its captive as truly as the predaceous man owns the animal he has trapped? Are not the earnings of labor as justly the grounds of possession to one organism as to another? Birds, fishes, insects, and other creatures who construct homes for themselves and their offspring doubtless, in unnumbered instances, lost their possessions and suffered because thereof, in their degree, much as Job suffered.

There is still less ground to doubt that parents were robbed of their offspring and that they suffered anguish on account of this, for parental care, parental solicitude, parental sorrow are expressed as sharply and unmistakably among many of our fellow animals as among ourselves, though the degree of intensity may be somewhat less.

Still less ground is there for doubting that thousands of creatures living millions of years before the appearance of man, suffered bodily pain; as well from disease as from accident and attack, and this suffering reached all degrees of intensity possible to them, not even being limited, as in the case of Job, to the sparing of life. It may be concluded, therefore, with the utmost safety, that the forms of suffering through which Job passed, had been experienced by preanthropic creatures for long, long ages before Job and his kind had come into existence. Though doubtless much greater in intensity, his sufferings did not differ in type from theirs, save perhaps in the infliction of Eliphaz, Bildad, and Zophar.

It seems therefore safe to conclude that nothing connected with human action was the cause of the primal introduction of suffering. No explanation of its existence or of its function seems to find a good basis in acts that are peculiar to man. There may be questions relating to special cases and special sufferings which are purely human questions, but the fundamental problem of the function of suffering must find its answer in a wider field and an earlier age. There is, therefore, peculiar pertinence, as well as great dramatic power, in the questionings that roused the oriental philosophers from their broodings over a special case of suffering, and cited them back to the "laying of

the foundations of the earth, when the morning stars sang together," for the origin is far back, and the purpose is connected with the beginnings of life on the globe, if indeed its origin does not lie even farther back in the very nature of the organization of the universe.

3. So far as we can see, however, from ordinary lines of evidence, there was a time in the history of the earth when there was no suffering upon it. There were long eras when no sentient creature, such as we now know and recognize, existed upon it. Then that rest in unconsciousness, for which Job prayed, was the common lot of all the earth. Activity and organization were indeed in progress, but attended apparently by neither sensation nor suffering. Organisms were coming into being, were growing, and were being destroyed. They were surpassingly beautiful; they were wonderful in their structures, but, so far as we can learn, they possessed no sensation. This interpretation may be an error, but it represents the state of current thought. We call them crystalline organizations and throw them into a lower category because we suppose them to lack sensation and with it the basis of suffering. By this classification and by this ranking of organisms rivaling living creatures in symmetry, and beauty, and marvelous structure, we unconsciously set the seal of our judgment upon the rank of that which carries with it sensation and thereby the possibility, if not, indeed, the necessity, of suffering.

4. Even after suffering came into existence, one great branch of living things developed along lines which kept it free from pain, so far as we can certainly learn, and it has continued so through all the ages up to the present day. This is not formed of dead matter as we falsely style the crystal. It is living, but living without apparent sensation of the higher sort and presumably without suffering. I do not need to say that I refer to plants. It appears, therefore, that both living and non-living organisms may exist without the basis of suffering and without any experience of suffering and that their history is at least as long and their numbers at least as great as the organisms that possess sensation, with its attendant pains and pleasures. Two

of the three major groups of organisms possess existence, growth, and activity without obvious suffering.

5. In the other great branch of living things, suffering was introduced at an extremely early date and has increased through the ages. Not only does it appear to have increased because the number of sentient creatures has increased, but because the creatures, for the greater part, have increased their individual capacities for suffering and their liabilities to suffering.

6. Now at once we meet the vital question—Did this increase of suffering go hand in hand with a decadence of the organisms as though it were the result, or the punishment, of degeneration or did it go hand in hand with an advancement and improvement of the organisms? In individual instances and in special types there was doubtless an increase of suffering corresponding with degeneration, but in the larger view an increase of suffering appears to have run side by side with the progress of the organisms. Suffering seems, therefore, to be either the handmaid or the Nemesis of progress. Is it a handmaid or is it a Nemesis?

7. The notable thing in the development of the life-forms through all the past is their adaptation to take advantage of their environments or to protect themselves against it. Modification has followed modification unceasingly in the endeavor to secure advantage and escape disadvantage in the great struggle of life. In a certain sense it may be said that experiment has followed experiment unceasingly in the endeavor to secure the maximum good. There is no question that there was a constant endeavor to escape suffering. Device upon device was brought into use in the effort to protect the organism against it. Shells, scales, plates, hardened integuments, and armors of manifold forms and wonderful adaptation appeared and took part in the great experimentation. Some have survived; some have long since been discarded. But all these, together with a similar series of devices for concealment and deception, for swiftness and agility in escape, combined to show the constancy and the greatness of the endeavor.

But all these adaptations were not brought into use solely to escape suffering. The case is not a simple one. We need



to examine it somewhat more closely. Some of these devices were not simply and purely protective, and of those that were, it was not always suffering against which protection was sought. The most fundamental casualty against which protection was developed was the destruction of the species. It was absolutely necessary to avoid this or the series ended and the experiment terminated. An organization which failed on this point failed on all. If the perpetuity of the species was to be gained through suffering, whether the suffering were helpful or merely a necessary evil, the suffering was accepted and endured. A part of the protective devices were therefore directed to the preservation of the species without immediate reference to the pain involved or even the death of individuals.

Next to the perpetuity of the species — and a means toward it — was the protection of individuals against fatal or crippling disaster. The disaster might not necessarily be very painful, but the perpetuity of the individual was essential to everything beyond and was guarded even though the individual suffered more by the devices of escape or endurance than he would from fatal disaster. If an organism took the other alternative and chose the less painful casualty, he simply dropped out of the series and the experimentation went on with those that chose to live, though they suffered. The life series was thus continued solely with those which chose suffering rather than fatal disaster. The others constantly disappeared. As a consequence, whenever suffering could be substituted for destruction the inherent law of selection and survival elected it.

Thus far the tendency was to augment suffering by making it take the place of greater evils. But there also arose a series of devices for substituting a lesser suffering for a greater, for lessening the suffering while retaining its good offices. It is obvious that the earlier a danger is apprehended, the easier and surer the escape, if escape is at all possible. Whatever, therefore, quickened apprehension of danger and extended the range of anticipation, increased the chances of escape, reduced the likelihood of disaster or of more serious suffering. So the quick-

ening of sensitiveness in the outer parts quickened the perception of incoming dangers.

It is better to be so constituted as to learn quickly and keenly the possibilities of serious harm, although this knowledge come with tangible pain, than to go on without the warning pain and suffer the greater harm. It is better to feel the evil by the very first touch, on its very approach, as it were, and even to feel it keenly and painfully, than to experience the greater damage that comes from stolidity. It was better for the ancient animals to realize danger and escape, than to rest in complacency until completely in the power of impending evil. It is better for us that the finger tip should smart with the first touch of fire, than that we should go unwarned until it is crisp and smoking or actually aflame. What would become of the clear vision of the eye if motes and cinders fell painlessly upon it? How many of us would have failed to dash ourselves in pieces, if the pain of a fall, and the pain of a fear of a fall, had not deterred us from dealing recklessly with the law of gravitation? How many boys would have failed to whittle their fingers off if these had not been full of nerves and blood?

Early and painful contact with incoming dangers, while a source of immediate suffering, was a protection against greater ills. But beyond this there arose devices that reached out across space and forward across time and gave wider warning of coming ill. To be most effective this warning became a keener and keener apprehension until it arose to a declared fear, and fear and apprehension are forms of suffering. They are anticipatory suffering. That which may be suffered is suffered in imagination already. But the wounds of the imagination are slight and soon healed, and if they lead to the avoidance of the real and lasting suffering, there is a notable gain. And, besides, they have this advantage that they put time and space between the source of danger and the actual contact with it. The out-reaching senses are the chief agencies of this protective function. The approaching danger is seen far off. It is heard at a distance; it is sniffed on the incoming air.

Thus, in the great experimentation of the ages, if you will

allow me to so phrase it, organisms have endeavored to clothe themselves about with protective devices of greater and greater efficiency ; (1) to preserve the species even at the loss of individuals and the incurring of pain ; (2) to preserve individual life, even though suffering be the means ; (3) to give pain quicker action and wider range to secure its premonitory functions, and (4) to substitute lesser and more anticipatory pains for the greater and more immediate ones.

The spheres in which these devices severally act may be likened to concentric envelopes surrounding the vital centers of each creature. The outermost is all that space about the creature that is penetrated by his outreaching senses, his sight, his hearing, his smell. This is the sphere in which apprehension, fear, acts and protects by forewarning. It is the sphere of anticipatory suffering, the slightest in degree and the most effective in results, if followed by appropriate action. Next within this is the sphere of surface contact, the periphery of the organism, in which the tactile senses work and give the first experience of incoming attacks. This is the sphere of initial physical pain. Within this sphere lie the less vital parts surrounding and measurably guarding the most internal and most essential, which lie at the center. The progress of the ages has been marked by the extension of these spheres and by an increase of their efficiency through manifold devices.

For our present purpose, interest centers upon the devices adopted for the zones of contact between the organism and the exterior, the protecting devices of the immediate surface of the body. Here two great lines of experimentation have taken their departure. In the one protection was sought by armorings of manifold kind, plates, scales, shells, callous integuments and external coverings of various sorts, direct devices against the impact and the intrusion of harmful agencies ; a direct effort to protect the vital parts and prevent suffering by interposing callosities and armatures. In the other, quite on the contrary, the external surface was made more and more sensitive to give quicker knowledge and keener realization of threatened injury, and to stimulate the organism to its highest endeavors in resist-

ance or escape. This necessarily involved an increase of pain. Success, indeed, within limits, lay in the quickness and keenness of the suffering, and the quickness and vigor of the stimulated response to it. Here, then, are two great lines of endeavor running through the ages—the one exalting pain to greater and greater keenness and promptness, the other interposing callosities to reduce or neutralize it. It is interesting and suggestive to follow the history of these two systems as they run parallel through the great past, and to learn what is the testimony of the actual experience of millions of years respecting the relative value of pain-eliminating and pain-exalting devices.

Unfortunately, the very beginning is not revealed to us. At the time life first appeared in well-preserved forms the organisms were already protected by various external coverings and this line of devices was far advanced. They were also protected by more or less sensitive exteriors or by senses that reached out beyond them and gave apprehension of threatened harm. Both protective systems were therefore well inaugurated. Now, if pain and suffering are fundamental evils, we should expect to find that system which depended chiefly upon shields and callosities and deadened senses growing more and more in prevalence, while that system which gave greatest exposure and keenness to painful attacks would less and less abound until completeness of armor or completeness of insensibility to pain were reached. If this were not so, the law of the survival of the fittest would seem to be sorely at fault. What is the testimony of the rock layers of the earth's foundations? The two systems have *continued* through the ages. We may, therefore, safely assume that both represent a good. But the system of superior sensitiveness with superior liability to pain, and, with little doubt, greater actual experience of pain, has markedly gained in dominance. Not only have the organisms in which this system has its best expression risen into the places of leadership and rulership, but types that once possessed the armor system in high development have abandoned it and adopted the other, and this *change of system* is one of the most significant facts of life history. The cephalopods present an excellent source of illustration, for they have lived

through the whole known life history of the globe. When first made known to us they were well provided with protecting shells into which they could withdraw themselves with comparative safety in the presence of harm. In many cases the mouths of these shells were peculiarly closed in about the animal, so that he was especially walled around by a fortress of his own creation. The shield system in this type reached a high degree of perfection at a very early date, but, singularly enough, in the course of time the cephalopods more and more abandoned these close coverings and extended themselves on the outsides of their shells. To such an extent did this go that at length the positions of the parts became essentially reversed. That which was once an enveloping shell became an internal skeleton. The sensitive parts were thrown outwards more and more until they enveloped the insensible ones; and the animals exposed themselves more and more fully, as time went on, to discomforting contacts and painful assaults. The compensation seems to have lain in greater sensitiveness, leading on to greater mental activity, to greater intelligence, to greater adroitness, to greater competency to escape or avoid harm. They appear to have found it better to know the sources of harm and to avoid them, even through transient pain, than to be housed in against the minor ills and fall before the greater ones. In a somewhat like manner, the early fishes were clad in heavy armor. The later fishes are chiefly covered with thin scales. Some indeed with only naked integument. They seem to have found sensitiveness, intelligence, and agility better than armor. Man himself, expressing the highest evolution among living terrestrial things, exhibits the outcome of the experience of the ages in the highest degree. Without armorial protection, not only, but rendered sensitive in a high degree by an exceptional distribution of sensory nerves upon the surface for the purpose of receiving impressions from without, whether they be pleasurable or painful, he expresses the culmination of the sensory system with its possibilities and actualities of suffering.

In the vast experience of the ages, therefore, it is found, *by*

*practical test*, that the highest and best adaptation to the environment is that which utilizes pain as a protection.

We have thus far been dealing with common pain in its usual expressions because it is more tangible and its history can be better followed and its results withal better understood. But the same general conclusions appear to apply to the higher forms of suffering. The growth of maternal love developed maternal solicitude, and opened the way to maternal suffering when loss of the object of love was experienced, and this suffering is doubtless the keenest ever realized. But it is maternal solicitude more than anything else that preserves to maternal love the object of its affection and the joys of the affection. It is preservative and protective of the source of joy. In all the stages of its evolution, from the thoughtless abandonment of the egg in the lower types of animals up through the numerous devices which maternal solicitude has evolved for the safety and well being of its young, we have an impressive lesson of the close serviceability, if not necessary attendance, of the highest infliction upon the greatest affection.

It would appear, therefore, that mental and physical sufferings are fundamentally protective. In their main function they are preservative and instructive. They make for the salvation of the organism. Fundamentally, therefore, they belong to the category of the good and not of the evil. In an environment wholly different from ours it may be possible to imagine an order of things in which there should be no need for pain as a protection or a teacher, but things being as they are here with us its serviceability appears to be well declared by the experience displayed in the life history of the globe.

If we assume another point of view, pain may be looked upon as the inevitable antithesis of pleasure. Job could never suffer from loss of property if he had not had great possessions and had delight in them. If he had been indifferent to his possessions, he could not have been grieved at their loss. His suffering in this particular was wholly conditioned upon his antecedent condition of prosperity and delight of property. If he had not loved his children he could not have mourned their loss. It was the

great possession of this fundamental affection that was the necessary groundwork of anguish when the affection was traversed by disaster. It is parental love that gives parental solicitude and parental anguish. Its intensity is conditioned upon the strength and the inherent enjoyableness of the affection. If Job had not experienced the benefits of sensation he could not have had that form which constitutes pain. The intensity of the pain was conditioned upon the capability of sensation and was the measure of the value of the possession of sensation.

This far we have endeavored to consider suffering in its main function, ignoring particulars and exceptions. To these, however, in a candid view, it is necessary to turn, for though it be granted that suffering is generally and fundamentally protective, preservative, and helpful, is it true in all particulars and in all cases? Granted that fear is normally a forewarning, is fear in all cases, and to all degrees a good? Very clearly it is not, so far as we are able to see. Very possibly it might appear otherwise if our intellectual vision were indefinitely extended. But fear seems not infrequently to bring the very disaster it should normally forefend. The bird that is frightened and flies often fills the huntsman's sack, though fright and flight are its normal modes of escape. It is sometimes best to sit coolly in the grass and let the huntsman pass. Suffering sometimes of itself brings the death from which it would normally save. Parental solicitude, unwisely entertained and unwisely manifested, sometimes promotes the destruction of the loved son or daughter.

As the case now stands, therefore, seeing no further into the depths of these problems than we do, we seem led to conclude that fundamentally discomfort, pain, and suffering are promoters of good, or the inevitable antitheses of enjoyment, while, on the other hand, exceptionally and frequently, indeed, they are evils without any obvious recompense.

I say without *obvious* recompense. It may be that in the higher organization of sentient beings the recompense is to be found. Error teaches its appropriate lesson, though the actor may be without fault. The chastisement may be, or at least may seem to be, unfair to him who has fallen into error innocently.

There are accidents when nobody is to blame—so we say—so we think—so indeed it seems. But the moral effect of the accident on the community is to promote alertness and caution, and effort to the end that similar accidents may be forestalled in the future. The occasional painful results of misapplied parental solicitude may teach us that wisdom must go with love and may lead to a better apportionment of the intellectual and emotional factors of affection. So in divers ways we recognize that there is some compensation for individual misfortunes in the larger moral effects. But it is hard to realize that it is adequate, or that, though it be a compensation to the wider circle affected by it, it is a compensation to the immediate sufferer. Here we seem forced to fall back upon Job's impregnable position—"Shall we receive good at the hands of God and shall we not receive evil?" On the whole, the institution of suffering brings us good. Shall we not accept as cheerfully as we may its fragment of ill?

Our practical attitude towards suffering is perhaps best illustrated by comparison. There is a close analogy between suffering and labor. Indeed labor to many is a species of suffering. Labor is the necessary condition of certain attainments. We have no difficulty in recognizing it as fundamentally a good, though it has sometimes been thought a curse. But it is not a good desired in itself and for itself. It is our constant effort to reduce it, to secure our ends with as little labor as possible; and this is right. The progress of civilization is marked by the lessening of labor in proportion to the fruitage of labor.

So with suffering. It is not a good to be sought in itself. It is to be eliminated. It is to be reduced to its lowest terms. It is to be anticipated and avoided. The sensory system is to be enlarged in its functions until it shall reach out into every part of our environment and foresee all possible harm and point the way of easy escape. The lighter anticipatory sufferings are to more and more take the place of the severer realized sufferings. The reach of warning vision is to extend itself farther and farther and deeper and deeper until no part of the earth is beyond its penetration. Already our electric eye sees the Asiatic pestilence while it is yet on the other side of the globe. Already our



microscopic vision discovers the microbean invader before he comes within harmful reach. And so, by the extension of the higher attributes that spring from exalted sensitiveness, the suffering to which it renders us liable may be reduced to its lowest ratio to the associated good of which it is the condition. And so, like labor, it may indeed continue to exist and to increase, but the associated good will increase more and more abundantly.

We have seen that from the earliest date in the known history of the earth there have been organisms that grew into marvelous beauty and continued long existences without obvious sensation or suffering, without desire, or pleasure, or pain. This is the Nirvana of matter.

We have seen that from an early date there have been living organisms which have grown into forms of wonderful interest and lived their lives without obvious sensation or suffering, without desire, or pleasure, or pain. This is the Nirvana of life.

We have seen that from an early date there have been organisms that have both enjoyed and suffered and that they have waged a long, long battle with the problem of securing the greatest good with the least suffering. We have found the effort lying along two great lines—the reduction of sensation and the exaltation of sensation—and both these lines are still running on into the future. And today we see our own race divided by two great aspirations representative of these historic lines, an oriental, striving to eliminate desire and pain and pleasure, leading on to a human Nirvana; an occidental, striving to exalt and intensify the sentient touch until it shall reach all possible things, and, by apprehending all possible things, anticipate and reduce suffering to a scarcely less than pleasurable foresight and avoidance of harm, while happiness shall be exalted and extended into a terrestrial Millennium and, at length, a celestial Heaven.